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I 
INTRODUCTION 
Borders are much more than s i mpl e edges . Rat h er, they encompass 
physical, cultural, social, and economic spaces that expand and contract 
along the physical line of the bor der. Instead of borders , we mus t rec-
ognize borderlands, which encompass the geography of border culture and 
economy. I Here we use borderlands to refer not only to the southwestern 
border states of the United States, but also to the states of Baja Calif -
ornia, Sonora, Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Durango, and the other drug production 
areas of the Republic of Mexico, as well as some of the major drug traffick-
ing impact areas within the United States, for these are the economic spaces 
affected by our adjacent boundaries and the areas affected by drug traffick-
ing in the borderlands. 
In this paper we examine the effects of this drug trafficking 
contrabandista activity, the rise and decline of Mexico's leadership as 
an exporter of illicit drugs, and some of the effects of organized traffick-
ing on the political economy of both Mexico and the United States. Smuggl-
ing and contraband are endemic to borderlands. As one knowledgeable observer 
estimated, "anywhere from 20 percent to 30 percent of all economic activity 
along our Southwestern border is illegal contraband.,,2 Of this contraband 
trade only a small percentage involves the smuggling of illegal drugs . 
Most of it involves the illegal rebalancing of border-created supply-and-
demand inefficiencies. Coffee, instant cocoa, parrots, vehicles, appli-
ances, human labor , mercury, guns, or drugs make up the traffic, and what-
ever is expensive in one nation and cheap in another pr ovide the incentive 
to the contrabandista. Like many kinds of crime and criminal activity, 
smuggling is functional and helps satisfy larger systemic needs. 
While the potential for such activity is natural to borderlands, it 
is more likely to occur when economic differences in adjacent cultures are 
great. The United States-Mexico border separates the greatest per capita 
income differences between two adjacent countries in the world; thus it is 
only natural that contraband, smuggling, and its attendant crime, corrup-
tion, and human exploitation would be common to this borderland . 3 What is 
surprising is that this subject is only rarely mentioned, much less system-
atically studied, by scholars interested in the borderlands. This paper 
is an attempt at correcting this situation, and will, it is hoped, mark 
the beginning of a series of long-term studies of contraband and the 
contrabandista, as well as the ramifications of this activity for both 
Mexico and the United States. Much work needs to be done, better statis-
tics and data bases gathered, and long-term funding support for this type 
of r esearch developed. We hope this paper can help point up these issues, 
the problems, and the importance of continuing and improving our research 
in this area. 
Here we examine one of the most publicized and more studied of the 
border contraband crime matrices, the trafficking in heroin. We focus on 
this contraband activity and its ramifications first because we are famil-
iar with it. We have spent the last several years researching and studying 
organized drug trafficking in New Mexico. 4 Second, because we believe that 
before one sets out to examine the less known and untidy world of the 
contrabandista, one should first study the more visible and known world; 
and much data has been collected, if not analyzed, on heroin traffic. 
Third, in keeping with a prudent approach, we believe that before entering 
into what could be a most dangerous game , it is wise to study the terrain 
from some dis tance . This we have done from the sanctuary of secondary 
analys i s . We know there are mi les to t r avel; we have, howev er, s ought t o 
take a first step . 
II 
UNITED STATES-MEXICO BORDERLANDS DRUG TRAFFICKING TRENDS: 
PAST TO PRESENT 
The 1,94S mile border between the United States and the Republic of 
Mexico has long been an area of drug trafficking and smuggling. In the 
nineteenth century, the Chinese communities in Mexico and the United 
States engaged in the production of opium in Mexico for use in Los Angeles 
and San Francisco. S The Los Angeles-Tijuana link was further developed in 
this century after the passage of legislation limiting the open sale of 
narcotic drugs and medicines. But for the most part, our Southwestern 
borderlands before World War II lacked the people, money, leisure, or at-
titude to make it much of a market for illicit drugs. While there were 
local addicts and indigenous users, these tended to be few in number and 
underground in life- style . The prime market was Los Angeles, and the 6 
Tijuana-Sinaloa connection appeared to be only major trafficking axis. 
The rest of the borderlands had their minor traffickers and user-entre-
preneurs loosely 1inked--often through kinship ties--to producer communi-
ties in Mexico, but this border traffic was largely unorganized, with 
half-ounce and ounce shipments constituting the bulk of the trade. Such 
small-scale enterprise is economically and risk efficient in the border-
lands. One important structural point to remember is that the further one 
gets from the border, the greater the need for organization and the traf-
ficking in larger unit$ of illicit drugs. This fact changes both the 
nature of the enterprise and any interdiction strategies or public policy 
alternatives. 
It was nuring World War II, with the allies cut off from other legal 
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sources of drug supplies by the fighting, that Mexico became a source 
of morphine for the licit market and of heroin for the illicit. Simi-
larly , t he war created a need for hemp for rope and cordage, which led 
to the large-scale cultivation of marijuana both in Mexico and the 
United States . 7 After the war, such cultivation appears to have de-
clined, and it was not until the "epidemic" of drug use in the 1960s 
that border states, and later the federal government, began to take 
cognizance of the role and potential of Mexico in the total drug 
trafficking picture. In May of 1969 the California legislature first 
noted the "fire storm" of drug use in the state. 8 In the rest of the 
southwestern borderlands it was still considered a minor indigenous 
problem by most federal agencies. 
The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) in their 1970 
budget hearings with Congress, for example, noted : "Heroin from 
Mexico is not considered a major problem. New York City is the key 
point of entry for heroin distribution throughout the United States.,,9 
Mex ico was considered by BNDD that year, however , to be a major source 
of barbiturates and amphetamines a s well a s the source of large amounts 
of marijuana smuggl ed i n to t he Un ited States. An examination of U.S . 
Customs data from the San Ysidro-Tijuana border from the 1960s (Table 1) 
See Table One 
suggests that BNDD may have been missing some early signs that things 
were beginning to change. 
While drug statistics and seizure data must always be examined with 
caution, it is the pattern, not the specific numbers, that are of interest 
here . By the end of the period, drug trafficking in all common types was 
substantially on the increase. We also would note that in 1967 the 
U. S. Customs Service at the San Ysidro station estimated that they were 
only seizing some 4% or 5% of the drugs being smuggled across. lO 
Elsewhere in the southwestern borderlands in 1968-1969, the BNDD 
found only minor drug trafficking from Mexico. In Texas, they noted, 
"only gram and ounce traffic by independent smugglers carrying small 
amounts. "11 In Arizona and New Mexico, they found, "capsule (gram) 
amounts of heroin .. • (with) none of the traffickers supported by orga-
nized crime . "12 In these areas of the border BNDD also found that even 
the marijuana was mostly "domestic and homegrown."13 
On the other side of the border there appeared, throughout this 
period, to be greater concern . The so-called "gran campana" against the 
cultivation of opium poppies and marijuana was launched by the Mexican 
government in 1948.14 But this effort consisted of only occasional raids 
on fields in Sinaloa, Sonora, Chihuahua, and Guerrero . Richard Craig, 
a student of this period, notes that it was not until 1961-1962, after 
acquiring some $500,000 in surplus U.S. aircraft, helicopters, jeeps, 
wagons, and spare parts, that some 3,890,316 square meters (961 acres) 
of drug cultigens were destroyed . lS The major effect of these raids 
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appears to have been the displacement of these fields and their relocation 
in more mountainous terrain . 
•.• opium and mar~Juana cultivators, aware of the increased 
probability of aerial detection , began concealing their 
crops amidst legitimate ones and planting smaller crops in 
even more remote regions. 16 
BNDD in Mexico, working with the Mexican government, did not find much 
in the way of major heroin production or trafficking; they did, however, 
begin to find marijuana for export on the increase in 1968-1969. 
July 26, 1968. Guadalarjara, Mexico. 7 lbs. heroin; 
2,2 lbs. opium gum; 17 lbs. marijuana seized. The 
defendants are considered to be the biggest suppliers 
of opium in Michoacan State. 
November 13, 1968. Playa Azul, Michoacan, Mexico. 
4 , 000 lbs . bricked marijuana seized. 
November 19, 1968. Playa Azul, Michoacan, Mex ico. 
6,000 lbs. bricked marijuana seized. (3/4th miles 
from site of first seizure.) 
November 10, 1969. Guamuchil, Sinaloa, Mexico. 
6.6 lbs. heroin seized. 17 
In a sixteen-month period from 196~ to 1969 BNDD seized a total of 13.6 
lbs. (6.8 kilos) of heroin in Mexico. l 
In 1969, however, the United States government in a dramatic policy 
shift entitled "Operation Intercept" attempted to halt drug trafficking by 
the simple expedient of stopping everyone crossing the border. This op-
eration, better termed "Operation Fiasco," tied up border traffic, angered 
the Mexico government, and found little marijuana or heroin in its eight 
weeks of operation. 19 Secretary of State , Henry Kissinger, later argued 
that the purpose of Operation Intercept was not to seize drugs, but to con-
vince the Mexican government to pay greater attention to drug production 
within its borders. The State Department, at that time, and scholarly 
analysis later disputes this reasoning. But with increased aid to Mexico, 
greater cooperation, and technical assistance to Mexico's "La Campana 
Permanente" the joint U.S.-Mexican effort to eradicate opium poppy and 
marijuana was begun. 20 
Not until 1972, however, with the breaking of the "French Connection," 
did the heroin market structures and distribution patterns radically shift," 
and Mexican drug trafficking and opium poppy fields blossom. Mexican "mud," 
brown heroin, was suddenly in great demand. From 1972 through 1976 Mexico 
reigned as "queen" of the heroin trade and the leader in supplying an ever 
increasing demand for marijuana. By 1977 and 1978 , however, the impact of 
the cooperative Mexican-United States efforts to locate and eradicate opium 
poppy field and marijuana pastures , and the TRIZO and JANUS programs that 
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this cooperation spawned, was beginning to be seen. These programs, as well 
as a declining demand for heroin (as purity declined to almost zero because 
of improved interdiction and prosecution of major traffickers), preference 
and traff icking shifts to Colombian marijuana and cocaine, and the Paraquat 
spraying pro~Iam, all lessened demand for Mexican heroin and marijuana in the 
U. S . market. 
By summer 1978 trends could be clearly seen that Colombia had displaced 
Mexico as the major supplier of the American drug demand. Cocaine and 
Colombian marijuana were the drugs of choice. The penalties for cocaine or 
marijuana smuggling are much milder than those for heroin, thus lowering 
risk/penalty ratios for volume trafficking in these drugs. Tremendous pro-
fits and new middle-class demand also helped make this shift attractive. 
Today Colombia is first in this illicit drug market. Along with these 
changes, the success of the U.S.-Mexican programs has affected Mexico's 
leading position as a heroin producer. Now as overdose deaths indicate, 
Asian "Golden Triangle, " Pakistani, and Iranian white heroin appears to 
have taken an increasing share of the market away from Mexican trafficking 
organi zations. Table 2 provides one illustration of t hese shifts . Indeed , 
impressionistic data sugges t that the Colombian traffic is even affecting 
See Table Two 
Mex ico ' s natural dominance in the drug markets of the borderlands . 
The vast profits to be made from trafficking during the heyday of 
Mex ico's leadership in poppy and marijuana production led to the develop-
ment of a number of sophisticated organized criminal groups and trafficking 
structures. Major crime families operated in Ciudad Culiacan in Sinaloa 
State, and in Durango State . The Durango or Herrera Organization was con-
sidered by the Drug Enforcement Administration to represent the single most 
important group. Other families among the six major trafficking organizations 
are of almost equal importance, wealth and influence, but the Herrera "Family" 
is typical of them and illustrates the structure and operation of Mexican 
drug trafficking groups and their impact on both sides of the border. 
III 
THE STRUCTURE AND ECONOMICS 
OF THE HERRERA ORGANIZATION: 
THE DURANGO-CHICAGO CONNECTION 
The Herrera "family" is said to have been in the heroin trafficking 
business since 1957. 23 While their home base is Los Herreras in Durango, 
Mexico, members of the Herrera group have been living in the Chicago area 
since the 1950s. It was not until May 1972, however, that the Herreras 
were specifically mentioned as being large-scale traffickers. In that 
month the "Noche. y Dia" Club, owned by Asuncion Herrera-Chavez, and " El 
Alacran" Club, run by Reyes Herrera-Berrera and his three sons, were cited 
by the Illinois Department of Law Enforcement as being major trafficking 
headquarters. 24 It is likely that the Herreras were well-established by that 
date, although at the time the Chicago Police were not yet knowledgeable 
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about Mexican "brown" heroin. Indeed, a year later, two officers stopped 
and released a young Mexican national in the vicinity of these two clubs 
after accepting his story that the brown soil-like substance filling a 
suitcase i n his car was Mexican "fertilizer.,,2S By 1978, however, both 
local and federal law enforcement were well acquainted with the Herrera 
organization and what the Illinois Legislative Investigating Commission 
called the "Heroin Highway" stretching from Durango to Chicago. 
To students of illicit organizations and their operations, as well 
as to borderlands scholars, the Herreras' heroin trafficking operations 
provide fascinating material for study. The Herreras are in all likeli-
hood the premier "contrabandistas" of the United States-Mexico border-
lands. The DEA considers them the largest single heroin supplier organi-
zation in Mexico, estimating their profits at $100,000,000 a year. 26 Such 
net profit would place the Herrera group about l16th in the Fortune magazine 
listing of America's most profitable corporations, and ninth , just behind 
Safeway Stores , in profit earned by U.S. retailers. 27 To students of 
border issues perhaps the most fascinating thing about the Herrera organiza-
t ion is that the vast majority of this profit is returned to the Republic 
of Mexico. 
The base of the Herrera organization 1 s operations is Durango State, 
Mex ico: in the capital, Durango, where Jaime Herrera-Nevarez lived for 
many years, and where his associate Enrique Diaz-Garcia owns an illicit 
heroin processing laboratory; up the secondary highway, Durango 89, past 
Los Herreras , the family stronghold where Arnoldo Herrera- Herrera owns a 
heroin laboratory ; and on to Tepehuanes, some two hundred kilometers 
Northwest of the capital city, where Manuel Herrera-Herrera controls a 
seasonal heroin laboratory; Durango State is Herrera country. In the 
summer of 1978 Jaime Herrera-Nevarez moved south to the Zacatecas-Guadalajara 
area, where his long-time friend and partner , Manuel Villareal-Valdez, re-
sides. 28 A Herrera cousin, Carlos Herrera-Araluce is Mayor of Gomez Palacio 
in East-cen1gal Durango State and said to run a heroin-processing labora-tory there. Another cousin of the Herreras is a police official in 
Hidalgo del Parral in southern Chihuahua State and is said to facilitate 
Herrera interests from there. The Herreras' influence and investments 
are felt across all North Central and Western Mexico, but as one DEA agent 
noted, Durango is their corporate headquarters. 
The Herreras control the City of Durango in the same 
manner that American corporations have controlled company 
towns in the United States. 30 
In organizational structure and style, the Herrera group is rather 
similar to Italian-American organized crime groups operating in the United 
States during Prohibition. The approximately 2,000 members of the " family" 
are all of the same ethnic group and come from a particular geographic area 
of their country of origin. They are related either directly by blood ties 
and kinship, or through the cross-ties of marriage. As did the old Italian-
American organized crime leadership, they tend to live relatively modestly 
in both Mexico and in the United States. As did the old Italian groups 
they tend to send their money, or some portion of it, home, and they seek 
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respite there, as well as sanctuary from American law enforcement. 
Structurally, the Herrera organization consists of six interrelated 
families. The senior members of these families (Jaime Herrera-Nevarez, 
Manuel and Arnoldo Herrera-Herrera, Heliodora Herrera-Medina, and Luis 
Herrera-Vengas) are responsible for overseeing the organizational tasks of 
production and processing as well as the management and investment of capital. 
These organizational tasks include the hiring of campesino farmers, the dis-
tribution of poppy seed, the development of new production areas, the over-
sight of habitad6res, who collect the opium gum, the supervision and manage-
ment of the laboratories, and the "stepping on" (Le., cutting and diluting), 
packaging, and shipment of the heroin to Chicago. 31 While the life-style 
of the family members in Mexico is more visible and somewhat more opulent 
than that of those in the United States, it is for the most part unpreten-
tious. The vast majority of the organization's wealth is invested in ranches, 
land, dairies, apartments, and the financial institutions of Durango and 
Mexico's western region. 
The younger members of the family (Reyes Herrera-Nevarez , Adalberto 
Herrera-Medina, Jose Herrera-Manquero, and their relatives) run the dis-
tribution and wholesaling end of the business in Chicago. 32 Their neigh-
borhood bases are in the Roseland, Pilsen, Blue Island, and Aurora sections 
of the city. They are also responsible for transshipment to retailing 
groups in Louisville, Detroit, Boston, Springfield (Massachusetts), Hart-
ford, New York City, Philadelphia, and Puerto Rico. 
Efficient organizational management is maintained by some 26 executive 
level directors, and a vast array of "field representatives" in a number 
of American cities. 33 This network is held together through the Herrera 
organization's Chicago "offices" and through constant communications and 
trips back to the organization's headquarters in Durango. 
Two aspects of the Herreras' operations are of interest to us in 
this paper: first, their transportation and transshipment of heroin 
through the borderlands; second, their return shipment to the Mexican econ-
omy of large sums of untaxed United States currency. This second aspect of 
the Herreras' operation is particularly significant as it has been ignored 
for so long by students of the borderlands. The traditional wisdom is that 
drug trafficking crime matrices, particularly those from less developed 
nations, such as Mexico, are unimportant from the perspective of political 
economy because the bulk of the profits occur in the recipient nation, and 
only small sums return to the producing nation. Indeed, it has been argued 
that even the money that does return to the less developed illicit drug 
producing country is of little concern for it will be spent on expensive 
luxuries and advanced technology products, which are produced in the high-
technology drug-consuming nations. 34 We challenge this conventional view, 
for the data from the Herrera organization indicate, as we shall show, 
that under certain organizational conditions a large percentage of the pro-
fits rapidly leave the illicit drug consuming country and return to the pro-
ducing nation. Second, we find little comfort in the view that these "drug-
dollars" will quickly find their way back into the U.S. economy. We note 
that there are other advanced technology nations (for example, Japan and 
West Germany) producing goods that compete for these narcodollars. And more 
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important, we note that the producing nations themselves offer attractive 
investment possibilities. We see little reason why a group like the Herreras 
should r e turn their drug-dollars to the United States through the purchase of 
New York City office buildings , or Beverly Hills estates, when the ranches, 
dair ies , and resort developments of Mexico offer attractive returns. From 
t his point of view, we see drug trafficking as having an important effect on 
North/South relations . And, it may well be that the argument we are present-
ing for Mexico could be made regarding the Colombian drug-dollars as well. 
The DEA estimates that the Herrera organization imports 0.37 tons (746 
lbs.) of pure heroin into the United States each year. This amounts to some 
8.14 tons of "stepped on" five percent heroin for retail. According to the 
Drug Enforcement Agency, this amounts to one-third of the total Chicago mar-
ket for this drug. 35 
There are a number of ways to move illicit contraband across a border. 
In the heroin trafficking matrix, the most common way is for a half-ounce or 
ounce of heroin to be carried in a rubber condom and held inside the mouth 
or other or if i ces by human "burros" or "mule s . " This is perhaps the most 
common means of transport in t he borderland s thems elves. One New Mexico 
traffi cking group had s eventy-six such human "mules ' c rossing the border 
every month. After delivery of the heroin, they would return to Mexico via 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service bus, courtesy of our undocumented 
workers program . 37 
The Herreras' operations are too large and too far from the border to 
permit the use of this method. Their preferred method of transshipment is 
the "Durango drive-shaft," and the compartmentalized gas tank, although they 
have used door panels and other hiding places as well. 38 The "Durango 
drive-shaft" is a sleevelike device of the Herreras ' invention, which sur-
rounds the vehicle drive-shaft and can contain up to several kilos of her-
oin. The compartmentalized gasoline tank is simply that, a subdivided ve-
hicle gasoline tank, one part holding the fuel, the other several kilos of 
heroin. Once these devices are travel-dirty, they are hard to distinguish 
or detect. 
To bring their heroin across the border, the Herrera organization uses 
driver-"mules" who take a loaded vehicle from Durango to Chicago in 49 hours 
of straight-through driving . At the border crossing- -the Herrera group, 
according to one DEA map, prefers the El Paso, Del Rio, Eagle Pass, and 
Laredo check points--the mule will be observed by a Herrera representative 
to make sure he crosses undetected. 39 The U.S. Customs estimates, they are 
only able to interdict some two percent of the heroin crossing the Southwes4 border, so this phase of the Herreras operations usually proceeds smoothly. 0 
On arriving in Chicago the mule will be paid $800 to $1,000 for his work. In 
this manner the senior Herreras traffic their heroin across the borderlands. 
The second part of the Herreras' operations that is of interest involves 
the movement of United States (untaxed) currency back to Mexico. Much of 
this cash is returned by southbound "mules" or by higher level members of 
the organization who are returning home. One such Herrera family member was 
arrested just as he was about to leave Chicago carrying $94,000; another was 
stopped at the border and $217,970 found in a compartmentalized gas tank. 4l 
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Because of these problems, and other problems of "slippage" in sending cash 
back to Durango, the Herreras have turned to a different and unique method. 
They simply use the local poverty neighborhood currency exchanges (check 
cashing out lets) to send money orders back to Durango. A recent Congres-
siona l study found that between June 1976 and July 1977, the Herreras sent 
$625,906 from one South Halsted Street exchange to a bank in Durango. Be-
tween January 1975 and June 1977 they had sent $1,253,076 south of the bord-
er from another exchange. Indeed, in a single day they moved $125,000 in 
money orders through one poverty neighborhood exchange. 42 
In light of law enforcement interest in this method of funds transfer, 
the Herreras appear to have turned to Western Union to send their excess cash 
to Mexico. In 1976 they sent $270,680 to Durango through Western Union. In 
the first five months of 1977, as the government studied the currency ex-
change transfers, this jumped to $351,650. 43 
In total, the DEA and other federal, state, and local law enforcement 
agenc i es could trace just under $2 million ($1,878,323 . 23) from the exchanges 
and Wester n Union dur ing the period they s tudied . They estimate that this 
is probably about one percent of t he t ota l ( $100-$200 million) cash trans-
ferr ed to Mexico by the Herrera organization annually . 44 We believe that the 
$200 million figure is too high. Our analysis of the economics of the 
Herreras' operation indicates that $100 million is more nearly correct. 
The DEA estimates that it cost the Herrera organization between $5,500 
and $6 , 500 to get a kilo of heroin from the opium poppy fields of the Sierra 
Madre to the streets of Chicago. 45 The difference in these figur e s depends 
on whether they are bringing in ten percent heroin ($5,500)or five percent 
heroin ($6,500). As the Herrera group are primarily wholesalers, they are 
content to sell a kilo for $27,500, even though they could work for higher 
prices. 46 Given their costs, they net $21,000 or $22,000, depending on the 
level of purity of the kilo. Chicago Police Department intelligence indi-
cates that the Herreras have an organizational norm which states that a 
minimu~ of $17,000 is to be returned home to Mexico out of every kilo whole-
saled. 47 By working through these numbers, we can better estimate how much 
the Herrera group is likely to send across the border back to Mexico. This 
analysis is presented in Table 3. 
See Table Three 
The government's investigation of the Chicago currency ex changes , and 
DEA and U.S. Customs border stops over six months in 1976- 1977 , only account 
for about $2.1 million moving south. If we accept the notion that as border 
screens are designed to keep things out , and not to prevent things from leav-
ing, and the fact the Customs only stops ten percent of total contraband coming 
into the United States, it is possible that much larger shipments of untaxed 
cash are moving out. 48 Certainly our analysis would suggest that the move-
ment of over $100 million to Mexico by the Herrera organization is feasible . 
How many of the other major heroin trafficking groups that operate in the 
borderlands return similar proportions of their profits to Mexico is unknown. 
To examine further the impact of drug trafficking on North/South relations, 
we now turn to the political economy of drugs south of the border. 
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IV 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
OF DRUG TRAFFICKING IN MEXICO. 
THE HERRERA ORGANIZATION: PART II 
In Mexico a federal policeman is paid between $150 and $200 a month in 
salary. Given the contraband on the border, it is not surprising that mordidas, 
the payments of gratuities or bribes for the nonenforcement of law, are common-
place. The Herreras' organization obviously can make use of this, so perhaps 
we should not be surprised when Marshall Carter in her study of El Paso informs 
us of one relatively new Mexican border officer who has over $150,000 in U.S. 
bank accounts. 49 Obviously, if one is in the right place whether it is on 
the United States or the Mexican side of the border, one can earn significant 
sums by looking the other way. Thus the first impacts that the Herreras have 
south of the border, as probably they do on the U.S. side of the line, is in 
bribery and corruption of the guardians of that border. Unfortunately, due 
to the lack of systematic data, we cannot analyze this and can only note the 
need for regularized study. 
Farther south, the campesinos of the Sierra Madre can, with luck, earn 
$100 a year from the beans and corn they raise, If one adds to this the 
value of their labor, and the fruit of their livestock and family's efforts, 
this figure can be increased to $400 per year. The poor, often landless 
campesino, by planting an illicit 2.5 acres on government mountain wilder-
ness, can aid his family. The sowing and cultivation of opium with his corn, 
or on some rugged mountainside, can also greatly increase the campesino's 
income. At the same time, the camQesino has little understanding of the 
serious implications that his efforts to improve his lot have on some other 
distant society.50 By planting opium poppies on 2~ acres, a campesino can 
earn from $2,000 to $4,000 or more annually, depending on the number of crops 
he can harvest. 5l 
See Table Four 
In Table 4 we present several scenarios that estimate the Herrera organization's 
contribution in terms of local acreage planted in the Durango area. This table 
is based on a number of premises, which we will do our best to explain. As 
this is a secondary analysis, lacking access to either the Herrera account 
books or DEA intelligence files, we have used the best common-sense intelli-
gence possible. 
The different yield figures and alternative scenarios in Table 4 provide 
us with the range of acreage the Herrera organization must have in cultivation 
to produce their supply for the Chicago market. The varying yield formulas 
could reflect the varying soil or climatological conditions of the Sierra 
Madre region, or new learning on the part of DEA. Since it is impossible, us-
ing secondary source materials to know the answer to this, or to know the 
exact number of Herrera acres affected by the TRIZO eradication program, we 
simply present all the alternative likely yield and eradication scenarios. 
Obviously, if all the Herrera acreage had been eradicated by the TRIZO pro-
gram, they would be out of business. We assume, therefore, that they have 
the capacity to achieve at least one harvest. It may be that they had other 
acreage planted that was completely eradicated. The largest figure in the table 
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(2,035 acres) indicates what the Herrera group must cultivate to meet their 
tonnage under the poorest yield conditions. The smallest figure (185 acres) 
indicates the least amount of acres they need cultivated under the best 
conditions. It is likely that the Herrera organization receives their opium 
gum fr om some amount of acreage within this . extreme range. 
If the typical campesino family in the Sierra Madre cultivates 2.5 acres 
of opium poppies as DEA reports, then the Herrera organization provides employ-
ment for anywhere from 68 to 756 campesino families. This work, however, is 
highly labor intensive and, at harvest time, many more farm laborers would be 
employed. Indeed, DEA estimates that it takes 20 laborers to harvest the gum 
from one acre of opium poppies. 53 If this is so (and because of serial plant-
ing, all acreage does not mature at the same time, so that the average field 
crew can only harvest two acres), then anywhere from 680 to 7,460 farm labor-
ers could receive seasonal employment from the Herrera's illicit entrepreneur-
ship. This is admittedly a crude "guestimate," but it indicates the range of 
basic employment opportunities provided by the Herrera group in the Sierra 
Madre region. 
Using the various s cenar i o s pres ent e d in Table 4, it is possible to 
d e rive some i ncome estimates for the campesino f amilies who engage in the 
cultivation of this illicit crop. Table 5 presents these income estima tes. 
We assume in this effort that some of their income will go to pay harvest 
See Table Five 
labor and thus this income will be more widely dispersed in the Sierra Madre 
·communities. 
This analysis reflects the impact that the Herrera organization would have 
on the income of the campesino population of the Sierra Madre region. We sus-
pect, however, that the TRIZO program has probably displaced much of this 
cultivation to other areas and states east and south of the TRIZO program 
boundaries. 54 Whatever the case, it is evident from Table 5 that the cultiva-
tion of opium can greatly increase campesino income, and that any program to 
limit the cultivation of opium poppies must seek to provide alternative income 
possibilities and incentives for the campesinos. Indeed, because campesino 
earnings are so low, any extra income is likely to be quickly consumed with 
attendant multiplier effects on the merchandising and retailing sectors of the 
regional and local economy. 
The Herrera organization, through their illicit entrepreneurship in the 
borderlands, is putting, we estimate, nearly $1.5 million into the campesino 
economy, which is likely to have a "spending" multiplier effect several times 
that amount. 55 Such economic "pump-priming" is likely to have strong effects 
on the campesino economy. Through poppy cultivation a campesino can, for 
better or worse, move from a subsistence income and barter to participation in 
the cash economy. From dependence on the burro, he can achieve dependence on 
the pickup or four-wheel-drive vehicle. Indeed, the booming borderlands 
business in stolen trucks and four-wheel-drive vehicles moving south across 
the border underscores this transportation change. C.C. Benson of the National 
Auto Theft Bureau estimates that some 10,000 vehicles stolen in the United 
States each year end up in Mexico. 56 The majority of those vehicles stay in 
the Mexican borderlands, particularly the drug-producing regions. 
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While the Herrera's contribution to the campesino economy is large compared 
with earnings from traditional production and labor, it represents only 1.5 per-
cent of the total untaxed u.s. currency income they bring into the Republic of 
Mexico. Their annual investments, during the 1970s, of over $100 million a 
year in land, ranches, dairies, apartments, resort developments, and financial 
institutions is a tremendous, if illicit, boon to the Mexican economy. In 
light of the consequences of addition, and its multiplier effects of crime and 
human misery on the United States side of the border, this is not a pleasant 
conclusion to come to. But from the point of viewfQ~a less developed nation 
and its economy, so long as the illicit drug production and trafficking is for 
the export market, there are few incentives to eliminate totally this production. 
It is somewhat surprising, therefore, that the Mexican government has been as 
cooperative as it has in assisting the United States to eliminate opium and 
marijuana fields and bring major traffickers to justice. In 1978 Mexico spent 
some $40 million in these efforts. 57 This is far more than a token gesture 
and indicative of the strong desires the Mexican government has for amicable 
and close relations with the United States. 58 Given the shifting trafficking 
patterns to other less developed countries, however, this analysis of profits 
and incentives is something that our policy makers must recognize and ponder. 
V 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
DRUG TRAFFICKING IN MEXICO: PART III 
ESTIMATES OF HEROIN PRODUCTION 
AND DRUG-DOLLAR RETURNS 
TO THE MEXICAN ECONOMY 
DEA authorities estimate that there are six separate organizations 
that control production and smuggling of an estimated 10 tons of pure 
heroin into the United States each year. 59 
Governor James Thompson of Illinois made the above statement in February 
1978 at the opening of congressional hearings into drug trafficking in the 
Chicago area. ~fuile we agree that there probably are six major organizations 
engaged in this drug trafficking across the southwestern borderlands, we 
believe that the "10 tons of pure heroin" is either exaggerated or out of date. 
In order to get a better estimate of the total amount of heroin that 
could be produced in Mexico, and, in turn, imported into the United States, 
we must turn to the eradication and yield estimates of the U.S. government. 
In mid-October 1976, the DEA reported that it had destroyed some 38,500 fields 
of opium poppies, which it estimated made up between 85 percent and 90 percent 
of the total acreage in Mexico. 60 In 1978, DEA presented summary figures, 
which showed that in 1977 some 21,769 acres that could have yielded some 8,567 
kilos of pure heroin were eradicated. 61 This conversion is based on a DEA 
formula, which estimates that 2,471 acres yields 10 kilos of opium gum, 
equivalent to one kilogram of pure heroin (2.2 lbs.). Either DEA's math is 
in error or they have additional unstated assumptions regarding yields, for 
using their formula and numbers we find a yield (see Table 6) of 8,809 kilos. 
See Table Six 
If the 21,769 acres eradicated were the total acreage in Mexico and if 
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they had been unmolested for one or both harvests, anywhere from 8.5 to g4.6 
metric tons of pure heroin would have been available for export to the United 
States. Instead, the TRIZO eradication program removed much of this tonnage 
from t he market. The acreage eradicated, however, is not likely to be the 
total a creage planted in opium poppies, only SDme percentage of it. It we 
assume that in 1977 they were able to destroy the same percentage as in 1976 
(i.e., 85 percent to 90 percent) then, using the lower percentage figure, 
DEA and the Mexican government destroyed 21,769 acres out of a total acreage 
of 25,610 in poppy cultivation. This means that there were some 3,341 acres 
missed by the TRIZO program. If this acreage produced one harvest it could 
yield, using the 2.471 acres yields one kilo formula, some 1,336 kilos of 
pure heroin, or 1.3 tons. If totally unmolested, this acreage could yield 
2.6 tons for export. This estimate of between 1.3 and 2.6 metric tons avail-
able to the United States market appears more reasonable than Governor 
Thompson's "10 tons." It also appears to be more in line with the 0.37 met-
ric tons that DEA estimates is the Herrera organization's share of the U.S. 
market. The large drop in the purity of heroin available on the streets of 
this nation, from 5.1 percent in the beginning of 1978 to 3.5 percent in 
March of 1979 , also corroborates that the amount of pure hero in ava i lable 
for the market has d e cl i ned cons iderab ly.62 
If the range of from 1.3 to 2.6 metric tons of pure heroin available 
for export can be considered to be "ballpark," then we can estimate what 
the likely drug-dollar flow back to Mexico might be if every trafficking 
group behaved like the Herrera organization. Table 7 presents this analysis. 
See Table Seven 
From this analysis we can see that if every Mexican heroin trafficking 
group behaved like the Herrera organization is said to behave, then anywhere 
from $420 million to $1.5 billion dollars in U.S. currency could flow into 
the Mexican economy from the heroin trade. It is unlikely that other traf-
ficking organizations behave like the Herrera group, although we would note 
that Alberto Sicilia Falcon, who headed a large CUliacan-Tijuana to Los 
Angeles trafficking network, is said to have returned some $3.6 million a 
week to Mexico when his organization was operating at peak efficiency.63 
Given the large amount of drug-dollar flows back into the Mexican 
economy as well as the extremely large dollar amount of the estimated pos-
sible drug-dollar flows, it is surprising that the Mexican government has 
been as cooperative in eradicating the opium poppy crop as they have been 
in the past several years. Even with government cooperation, however, one 
must not forget the persistence and tenacity of human beings to improve 
their lot in life. For the poor campesino the growing of opium poppies 
will remain an extremely attractive proposition given his limited alter-
natives. 
In the fall of 1977, the DEA conducted a helicopter survey of Zone 06 
north of Culiacan in Sinaloa State. Here the fields of opium poppies have 
been the targets of eradication programs since the "gran campana" of 1945. 
Yet the survey found that of 1,055 fields flown over, some 608 had been 
destroyed, 270 had opium poppies growing, and 177 were in preparation for 
poppy cultivation. 64 The survey noted: "the large fields that had been 
destroyed were abandoned. The fields are smaller, dispersed . . . hidden 
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among traditional crops ... under high foliage.,,65 For more than thirty-
two years this area of Sinaloa State has been under surveillance and sub-
jected to poppy eradication efforts. Yet, the poppies are still being 
grown. To close, we would note that if just the 177 fields in preparation 
were each only one acre and left unmolested, they would more than supply 
the Herrera organization's share of the United States market. 
VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
In summary, we have in this paper examined one small aspect of the 
political and economic relationships that make up the complexity of the 
borderlands, the heroin trafficking crime matrix and its effects on the 
United States and Mexico. We have found that some forms of borderlands 
drug trafficking organization appear to provide an illicit and untaxed 
form of foreign aid for a less developed economy, aid that, we noted, 
reaches into very different sectors and levels within an economy as does 
the formal foreign aid program. Law enforcement, whether federal or lo-
cal, cannot be expected ever fully to accomplish its mission so long as 
such political and economic incentives to trafficking continue to exist. 
Finally, in terms of future research, much needs to be done. First, 
we--academics and scholars--need to work more closely with the State 
Department and law enforcement intelligence working in this field. We 
need access to data, and they need an outside, objective research and 
analysis of their formulas, data collection, and verification techniques 
if they are to serve the Congress and the nation. There is a need for on-
site research in Mexico, and other nations, and the development of coop-
erative projects and ties with our counterparts in the academy and drug 
law enforcement of those nations. There is also a need for comparative 
research studying the structure and function of trafficking organizations 
and cash flows and their effects on a nation's economy. Comparative 
studies between Mexico and other Latin American drug-producing nations 
and the Caribbean area would be a good place to start. Most of all we 
need to recognize the multifaceted nature of this policy problem and its 
effects. We hope this research can provide one example of a beginning, 
and that we and others can progress, learn, and develop a more sophisti~ 
cated understanding of all the aspects of drug trafficking as both a domes-
tic and international policy problem. 
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TABLE 1. DRUG SMUGGL ING SEIZURES AT THE SAN YSIDRO-TIJUANA CROSSING 
(FY 1960 THROUGH MAY 1968) 
Drug Seizures by Type and 'Amount 
Fiscal Year Marijuana 
(June 30-July 1) (lbs. ) 
1960-1961 393 
1961-1962 1,904 
1962-1963 924 
1963-1964 3,900 
1964-1965 6,331 
1965-1966 3,121 
1966-1967 16,133 
1967-(May) 1968 37,679 
Source: Michael Logan, "Smuggling Drugs and Narcotics 
in J. Price, ed., Tijuana ' 68 (mi~eo). August, 1968. 
Heroin Dangerous Drugs 
(ozs. ) (1,000 units) 
87 21 
42 14 
94 17 
240 530 
156 74 
174 102 
195 542 
441 947 
through the San Ysidro Station" 
I 
0 
C'-J 
I 
TABLE 2. MEXICAN HEROIN TRAFFICKING TO THE UNITED STATES 
IN THE 1970S AS INDICATED BY MEXICAN HEROIN'S SHARE OF 
THE U.S. MARKET 
Market 
Percentage 
100% 
90% 
80% 
70% 
60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 20% 
10% 
___ 50% 
38% 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Source: See footnote 22. 
Note: Although Mexico's share of the market in the late 
1970s was substantial, purity levels had dropped signifi-
cantly as a result of the eradication programs. 
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TABLE 3. 
PART I. 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HEROIN TRAFFICKING: 
THE HERRERA ORGANIZATION* 
Imported: 0.37 tons pure her oin = 8.14 tons (16,280 lbs.) 5% heroin 
8.14 tons yields 7 ,384 5% kilos. 
Wholesale price: $27,500 a kilo x 7,384 kilos = $203,060,000 Gross Profit. 
Profit Minus Costs: Costs: $6,500 per 5% kilo 
7,384 k ilos x $6,500 cost = $47,996,000 Gross Cost. 
Net Total Profit: =$155,064,000 
DEA Estimates 75%-80% Returne d to Mexico: =$116,284,000 at 75% returned. 
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: CHICAGO POLICE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION 
Total kilos: 7,384 
Organizational Norm: $17,00 0 minimum returned to Mexico from each kilo. 
Net return to Mexico: $125, 528, 000 
*The authors have converted metric tons and hectares used by DEA intelligence 
throughout this pape r. 
(" 1 
C' ~ 
I 
TABLE 5. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DRUG TRAFFICKING: PART II. 
CAMPESINO INCOME ESTIMATES FROM OPIUM POppy CULTIVATION FOR 
THE HERRERA ORGANIZATION VERSUS PLANTING TRADITIONAL CROPS 
SCENARIOS 
(See Table 4) 
Scenario A 
Scenario B 
Scenario C 
CAMPESINO INCOME ESTIMATES FROM: 
Opium Poppy 
Cultivation 
$ 1,628,000 
$ 789,000 
$ 272,000 
Traditional Crops 
and Labors 
$ 325,600 
$ 105,200 
$ 29,600 
Computation Rationale. Scenarios A and C are based on the 
most and least acreage requirements of Table 4. Scenario B 
is based on an average of the three different yield figures 
in that table. Note: We assume that the campenios would 
plant the same acreage of traditional crops under normal 
conditions as they do acres under the adverse TRIZO condi-
tions. This is probably an unreasonable assumption. In 
which case their earnings for traditional crops would always 
be close to the Scenario C case. 
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TABLE 6. ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HEROIN 
TRAFFICKING VARIOUS YIELD ESTIMA'TES OF DEA IS 1977 ERADICATED 
ACREAGE (21,769 ACRES) 
YIELD FORMULAS PURE HEROIN TONNAGE FROM: 
PURE HEROIN ONE HARVEST TWO HARVESTS 
1. 2.471 acres yield 
1 kilo (2.2 Ibs. ) 
DEAls math yield (8,567 kilos) 8.5 17.0 
Our math yield (8,809 kilos) 8.8 17.6 
2. 2.5 acres yield 
1 pound pure heroin 4.0 8.0 
3. 1 acre yields 
1. 75 Ibs. pure heroin 17.3 34.6 
Note: Yield formulas, see footnoes 52 and 61. 
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TABLE 7. ·ESTIMATED DRUG-DOLLAR FLOWS BACK TO THE MEXICAN 
ECONOMY FROM TOTAL HEROIN PRODUCTION AND HERRERA ORGANIZA-
TIONAL BEHAVIOR. 
Low estimate 
of total tonnage: 1.3 tons pure heroin = 26,720 kilos 5% heroin 
High estimate 
of total tonnage: 2.6 tons pure heroin = 53,440 kilos 5% heroin 
HERRERA ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 
Wholesale Price ($27,500 a kilo) 
Gross Costs ($6 , 500 a k ilo) 
Total Net Profit 
Estimated Return to Mexico (75%) 
LOW ESTIMATE 
CASH FLOWS 
$734,800,000 
$1 73 ,5 80 ,000 
$561,120,000 
$420,840,000 
HIGH ESTIMATE 
CASH FLOWS 
$1,469,600,000 
$ 347,360,000 
$1,122,240,000 
$ 841,680,000 
Using Chicago Police Intelligence formula the figures would be 
$525,453,000 and $1,050,906,000 returned to Mexico. 
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